









67 **Bills of Sale, Blank Deeds, and**  
**Blank Warrants, &c. &c., for sale at**  
**THIS OFFICE.**

lingsworth, Hooker, Howerton, Hutchison,  
Jarman, D. Jordan, Judkins, Kenan, Kenyan, I.  
Lang, W. B. Lee, J. F. Lee, Maglin, Marshall.

over the ruins of the Post Office, and mighd for  
crime. Every body was talking about the burning  
of the Mahezel (the Automaton King) could not have  
excited, or does not at this day create, so much talk  
Amos Kendall and his clerks, alias his hirelings  
were the heroes of all hearts, and suspicion su  
various hands applying, at the midnight hour, the  
necessary torch to the building of the public  
The books are gone—the records of official acts

S. F. PATTERSON, President.  
Raleigh, December 23, 1836. 30 3m  
To be inserted in *all* the newspapers printed within the State of North Carolina for *three* months—the bills to be sent to the Treasurer of the Bank, who will pay them to *order*.

Payetteville to Wilkesborough will run.  
Persons wishing to purchase valuable land would  
do well to call and view the premises. Terms  
made easy to the purchaser.  
**THOMAS HAMPTON.**  
Jonesville, Surry Co., N. C. Dec. 24, 1887.



## Nicholas Biddle, on the Currency.

PHILADELPHIA, Nov. 11, 1836.

MY DEAR SIR: I propose to the second subject of our conversation—the present state of the currency—when I said that dispassionately, as an abstract question of mere finance.

Our pecuniary condition seems to be a strange anomaly. When Congress assembled, it left the country with abundant specie and no paper for them—with every branch of industry flourishing—with more specie than we ever possessed before—with all the elements of universal prosperity. Not one of these has undergone the slightest change yet after a few months Congress will reassemble and find their old country suffering from pecuniary distress. The occasion of this, and the remedy for it, may well occupy our thoughts.

In my judgment the main cause of it is the management of the currency—mismanagement in two respects; the means of executing the Distribution Law, and the order regarding specie for the Public Lands.

1st. The Distribution Law. In July, 1835, Congress declared that the surplus in the Treasury on the 1st of January, 1837, should be divided among the States. That it might be done as gently as possible, the payments were to be made, not at once on the 1st of January, but quarterly throughout the whole year 1837; and as the aggregate sum to be distributed is from thirty-six to forty millions, we may assume the first payment in January to be about nine millions. To prepare for this, the Treasury has had to haul forty or fifty millions—it would receive in the course of the operation thirty or forty millions of revenue more—and as there was probably money in every State, and payments to be made in every State, the operation was so simple and easy that it ought not to have occasioned the distress, pressure either on public or private interests; and the whole might have been accomplished without any derangement of trade and without the movement of a single dollar in specie. That this not only could be done but has actually been done, you will find in the public documents of 1837.

In the year the new administration of Mr. Jackson, anxious to appropriate every disposable dollar, of the revenue to the reduction of the public debt, sought and obtained the aid of the Bank of the United States. Notice was accordingly given on the 31st of March, 1829, that on the 1st of July, the debt and interest, amounting to \$5,134,432 57, would be paid. At the period of the notice, the whole available means of the Treasury were only six millions, scattered through the United States, and these, with the accruing revenue in the interval, were at a notice of ninety days, to be collected, to pay nearly nine millions. So closely was the Government pressed, that after paying these sums, the actual balance in the Treasury throughout the whole United States, was reduced to \$1,456,654. The Bank, however, undertook the arrangement, with what success may be seen in the following part of the message of Mr. Jackson to Congress in December 1829. "The payment on account of the public debt, made on the 1st of July last was \$5,172,492 57. It was approved by the sudden withdrawal of an large sum from the banks in which it was deposited, at a time of unusual pressure in the money market, might cause much interest dependent on Bank accommodations. But this was who was averted by an early anticipation of it by the Treasury, aided by the judicious arrangement of the Officers of the Bank of the United States." The respective shares of the Bank and the Treasury may be conjectured from the Secretary's letter of the 11th July 1829, in which he takes occasion to express "the great satisfaction of the Treasury Department in the preparation for the heavy payment of the public debt on the 1st instant—which has been effected by means of the prudent arrangement of your Board, at a time of severe depression on all the productive employment of the country, without causing any sensible addition to the pressure or even visible effect upon the ordinary operations of the State Banks."

If nine millions, being almost the last dollar in the Treasury, could be thus distributed—two millions of it to foreigners—at a time of unusual pressure; how happens it that with funds equal to fifty millions, and with six millions more, nine millions cannot be distributed—exclusively among our own people—at a time of great abundance, without harrassing a convulsion? The answer is to be found in the different mode of conducting the operation. This may be seen by contrasting what the Secretary might have done, with what he has done.

The distribution law assigned to him two duties, both simple and both easy—the division of the funds among Banks and the division among the States. As to the first, he was to select as soon as may be practicable, and employ as the depositories of the money of the United States, such of the Banks as may be located at, adjacent, or convenient to the points or places at which may be collected or disbursed; provided that at least one such Bank shall be located in each State or Territory;—and that no Bank shall have on deposit more than three-fourths of its capital."

Here is no authority whatever to distribute the money from the Banks of one State to the Banks of another State. On the contrary, by the 12th section, all transfers for "another purpose whatever except to facilitate the public disbursements and to comply with the provisions of this act are hereby prohibited and declared to be illegal;" and "in cases where transfers shall be required for purposes of equalization under the provisions of this act in consequence of too great an accumulation of deposits in any Bank such transfers shall be made to the nearest deposite Banks which are equidistant and secure;" and although the supplement says that nothing shall prevent him from making transfers from State to State, "when required to prevent large and inconvenient accumulations in particular places, or in order to produce a due equality and just proportion according to the provisions of that act," the general policy of the law to keep the deposits together, unless under peculiar emergencies, remains unchanged.

Under this law the duty was as clear as possible. He was to see that no Bank should have a deposit of more than three-fourths of its capital. (The revenue in the great cities then, should be divided among the Banks in those cities—there being in each of them solvent Banks enough to receive it. There was no necessity for sending a dollar out of those cities. In New-York alone, says the operation will require the transfer of something like six millions of dollars from the old deposite Banks to new ones, either in the State or out of it." But why out of it all. Why could not the revenue already received in New-York and falling due in New-York be divided among the New-York Banks to support the trade of New-York? Why not let it remain active there up to the last hour when it was payable to the States? But the law required that there should be at least one deposite Bank in each State. It is so. Then make a deposite Bank in each State, if there be not one already, and give a deposite, which, while it satisfies the law, will not carry away into active funds that might be useful in place of business. There was then no necessity to send a dollar from New-York or the other commercial cities, merely for the purpose of preventing any one bank from having more than three-fourths of its capital. That is clear.

Nor was it more necessary for the purpose of distribution among the States. The law says: "That the money which shall be in the Treasury of the United States on the 1st of January, 1837, shall be deposited with such of the several States as shall be lawfully authorized their Treasurer or other competent authorities to receive the same—and the Secretary of the Treasury shall deliver the same to such Treasurer or other competent authorities to receive the same—and the Secretary of Treasury shall deliver the same to such Secretary of Treasury or other competent authorities to receive the same." This is the whole.

Now what does it contemplate? The money was to be in the Treasury on the 1st of January, 1837, because up to that time it is not known whether the States will take it. Technically and legally, the Treasury is at Washington—practically the Treasury is where the deposits of the public monies are. But the Secretary of the Treasury is an official person whose only official residence is Washington. Accordingly a Treasurer of the State goes to the Secretary at Washington—and presents to him the certificates of deposit. The Secretary thereupon "delivers" to the Treasurer his State's quota. But how does he deliver it? By an actual manual count—out of these dollars?—No. By a check on the Deposit Bank at Washington?—No. But he delivers to the State Treasurer as he does to any other person receiving money, a draft for the amount on some or more of the depositories which compose the Treasury. Is not such a draft the usual and proper mode of making public payments?—Undoubtedly. And then we come to the real question. Was it necessary to make in advance any transfer of funds whatsoever into the several States merely because they had the option, on certain conditions, of receiving them? If there was no such necessity, the money was to be deposited with the States not in them. It was necessarily paid in Washington by drafts on other places. If you say that the Secretary must pay it into the State Treasury, it is not enough to bring it into the State—he must take it to the State of Government. Pennsylvania must have her share—not in Philadelphia, but in Harrisburg. New-York must be paid, not in the city of New-York, but Albany. If the place be not fixed by law, the mutual convenience of the parties will designate it. Now there is no individual and no State in the Union that would not prefer payments in New-York or the north Atlantic cities, to payments any where else; and for this obvious reason—that money is worth more there than any where else. If the State of Ohio, for instance, had a draft on New-York, it could sell it to its citizens, usefully to them and profitably to the Treasury. It does not want the money brought to Ohio. Every mile it comes on the road lessens its value. We may safely conclude then that there was no necessity for sending a dollar of public money from New-York or the commercial cities for the purpose either of equalizing funds among Banks—or distributing them through the States.

The true theory of the case, therefore, was simply to let excesses of the revenue in the several States be transferred, in the course of trade, to the great commercial points, and then to pay the States by drafts on those points. The deposite Banks at those points, knowing what they had to pay, would have been ready to pay; and up to the hour of payment would have employed the funds usefully; so that in every stage of that progress, business would be assisted, commercial activity stimulated, and all parties be gainers.

Even supposing these transfers at all necessary—the funds should have been remitted by bills to the points of accumulation—blending these operations so inseparably with the business of the country as to be unfelt except in their benefits. But what has the Secretary done? Instead of gradual preparations to provide funds at the distant points, the whole science of the Treasury seems to have consisted in drawing warrants—in taking up the columns of the returns and directing drafts from the Banks throughout the United States without necessity—without reference to the wants or the business of the different sections of the Union, the season of the year or the course of trade—and thus making the revenue of the country.

His secret is thus revealed in the letter to Messrs. Griswold & Swan: "I have therefore, in cases where the public money had accumulated in any Banks in any one State, and new Banks could be seasonably obtained in any other States where only a little public money existed, made but one transfer to accomplish both objects, and by a single operation have reduced the excess in certain Banks in certain States, and placed it in the States where it would be most useful, and where it would be most wanted in equal portion of the public money."

We thus perceive—what on less authority would be inadmissible—the extraordinary manner in which the public revenue has been scattered. The Secretary sees an accumulation of public revenue in any one State. He sees another place in another State "where only a little public money already existed;"—whereupon he resolves, without the least authority from Congress to bestow upon that place "an equal portion of the public money;"—and as he will have, twelve months hence, to pay some money in that State, he makes "a single operation" of it—and accordingly he confesses that he actually transferred public monies into States which cannot receive them for a year afterwards—depriving the very community which raised the money of the use of it during that whole period.

Such a measure was of itself sufficient to disorganize the currency. But it was accompanied by another which armed it with tenfold power of mischief. This was the Treasury order prohibiting the receipt at the Land Office of any thing but specie—an act which seems to me a most wanton abuse of power, it is not a flagrant usurpation.

The whole pecuniary system of this country, that to which, next to its freedom, it owes its prosperity, is the system of credit. Our ancestors came here with no money—but with far better things—with courage and industry—and the want of capital was supplied by their mutual confidence. This is the basis of our whole commercial and internal industry. The Government received its duties on credit and sold its lands on credit. When the sales of land on credit became inconvenient from the complication of accounts, the lands were sold for what is termed cash. But this was only another form of credit. For the banks, by lending to those who purchased land, took the place of the Government as creditors—and the Government receiving their notes as equivalent to specie, because always convertible into specie. This was the usage—this may be regarded as the law of the country. By the resolution of Congress passed on the 29th of April, 1816, it was declared that "no duties, taxes, debts or sums of money, accruing or becoming payable to the United States as aforesaid, ought to be collected or received or otherwise than in the legal currency of the United States, or Treasury notes, or the Bank of the United States, or in notes of Banks which are payable and paid on demand in the said legal currency of the United States."

The resolution presents various alternatives—the legal currency—or Treasury notes—or notes of the Bank of the United States—or notes of specie paying banks. A citizen had a right to choose any one of these modes of payment. He had as much right to pay for land with the note of a specie paying bank as to pay it for duties at the custom house. If this be denied, certainly any one might as well refuse to pay every thing but the most difficult thing—to do it without notice of the approaching change in the fundamental system of our dealing—is an act of gratuitous oppression.

Under the operation of this resolution, the bank had gone on, fearing nothing, as they had only to provide for the usual specie calls upon them—and saw the country full of specie, with no foreign demand to draw it from them;—when, on a sudden, without any information of the coming shock, an order was issued by the Secretary, declaring that their notes were no longer receivable and of course inviting all who held the notes or had deposits in those banks, to convert them into specie. It is in fact made at once the whole amount of their circulation and private deposits a specie demand upon them. The first consequence, was that the banks nearest the land strove to fortify themselves by accumulating specie. It was just at this moment that the warrants for transfers were put into their hands. The combination of the two measures produced a double result—first, to require the Banks generally to increase their specie, and next, to Banks. The commercial community were thus taken by surprise. The interior Banks making no loans and converting their Atlantic funds into specie, the debtors in the interior could make no remittances to the Merchants in the Atlantic cities, who are thus thrown for support on the Banks of those cities at a moment when

they are unable to afford relief on account of the very abstraction of their specie to the West. The creditor States not only receive no money, but their money is carried away to the debtor States, who in turn, cannot use it, either to pay old emigrants or to contract new. By this unnatural process the specie of New-York and the other commercial cities is piled up in the Western States—not circulated, but used, and held as a defence against the Treasury—and while the West cannot use it—the East is suffering by the want of it. The result is, that the commercial intercourse between the West and the Atlantic, is almost wholly suspended, and the few operations which are made, are burdened with the most extravagant expense. In November, 1836, the interest of money has risen to twenty four per cent.—merchants are struggling to preserve their credit by ruinous sacrifices—and it costs five or six times as much to transmit funds from the west and south-west, as it did in November 1835, or 41, or 39. Thus while the exchange with all the world are in our favour—while Europe is alarmed, and the Bank itself uneasy at the quantity of specie we possess—we are suffering because, from mere mismanagement, the whole ballast of the currency is shifted from one of the vessels to the other.

In the absence of good reasons for these measures, and as a pretext for them, it is said that the country has overtraded—that the banks have over-issued, and that the purchasers of public lands have been very extravagant. I am not struck by the truth or the propriety of these complaints. The phrase of overtrading is very convenient but not very intelligible. If it means any thing, it means that our dealings with other countries have brought us in more specie than we need, and is rectified by exportation of specie or stocks in the first instance—and then by reducing the imports to the exports. Now the fact is, that at this moment, the exchanges are all in favor of this country—that is, you can buy a bill of exchange on a foreign country cheaper than you can send specie to that country. Accordingly, much specie has come in—none goes out. This is at a moment when the exchange for the last crop is exhausted, and that of the new crop has not yet come into the market—and when we are on the point of sending to Europe the produce of the country, to the amount of eighty or one hundred millions of dollars. How then has the country overtraded? Exchanging with all the world is in favor of New-York? How then can New-York be an overtrader? Her merchants have sold goods to, and under ordinary circumstances able to pay—but the mere fault of the government, as obvious as if an earthquake had swallowed them up, their debtors are disabled from making immediate payment. It is not that the Atlantic merchants have sold too many goods, but that the government prevents their receiving payment for any. Moreover in the commercial cities money can be had, though at extravagant rates, for capitalists add to the ordinary charges for the use of it a high insurance against the loss of it. It is not then so much that money is not to be procured, as that doubt and alarm increase the hazards of lending it.

Then as to the Bank. It is quite possible that many of the Banks have extended their issues—but whose fault is it? Who called these Banks into existence? The Executive. Who tempted and goaded them to these issues? Undoubtedly the Executive. The country five years ago, was in possession of the most beautiful machinery of currency and exchanges the world ever saw. It consisted of a number of State Banks protected, and at the same time, restrained by the Bank of the United States.

The people of the United States through their representatives re-chartered that institution. But the Executive, discontented with its independence, rejected the Act of Congress—and the favorite tone of declaration was, that the States would make Banks, and that these Banks could create a better system of currency and exchanges. The States accordingly made Banks—and then followed all the disasters about the loans of these banks and their enlarged dealings. And what is the consequence? The Bank of the United States has not ceased to exist more than seven months, and already the whole currency and exchanges are running into inextricable confusion, and the industry of the country is burdened with extravagant charges on all the commercial intercourse of the Union. And now, when these Banks have been created by the Executive, and turned into these excesses instead of gentle and gradual reforms, a fierce crusade is raised against them—the funds are harshly and suddenly taken from them, and they are forced to extraordinary means of defence against the very power which brought them into being. They receive, and were expected to receive, in payment for the Government, the notes of each other, and the notes of other banks, and the facility with which they did so, was a ground of special commendation by the Government. And now that Government has let loose upon them a demand for specie, to the whole amount of these notes. I go further: There is no outcry abroad, raised by faction and echoed by folly, against the Banks in the United States. Until it was disturbed by the Government, the banking system in the United States was at its height. What was desired for its perfection, was precisely what I have so long striven to accomplish—to lead as good as that of any other commercial community the metallic basis of the currency, by a greater infusion of coin into the smaller channels of circulation. This was in a gradual and judicious train of accomplishment. But this miserable folly about an exclusively metallic currency is quite as absurd as to discard the steamboats, and go back to poling the Mississippi. Banks may often err from want of skill, and occasionally be injurious as steam is—but it is not the less true, that the banks of this country have been the great instrument of its improvement, and that during all the convulsions of the last fifteen years for every American Bank which has failed at least ten English banks have failed.

So with regard to the lands. For the last five years the amount of the sales of the public lands has been a constant theme of congratulation with the Executive. In the very last message, on the 12th of December 1835, he repeats the same strain. "Among the evidences of the increasing prosperity of the country, not the least gratifying is that afforded by the receipts of the public lands, which amount in the present year to eleven millions of dollars. This circumstance attests the rapidity with which agriculture, the first and most important occupation of man, advances, and contributes to the wealth and power of our extended territory." In the same message he declared that "the circulating medium has been greatly improved. By the use of the State Bank it is ascertained that all the wants of the community in relation to exchange and currency are supplied as well as they have ever been before." Scarcely seven months elapse when these pastoral and financial visions dissolve in air. Agriculture ceases to be "the first and most important occupation of man"—the State Banks cease to be the models of exchange and currency, but forth issues the Secretary with a declaration that to protect the Treasury "from frauds, speculation and monopolies in the purchase of public lands," from "excessive bank credits," "from ruinous extensions of bank issues"—nothing shall be received for land but gold and silver.

Now what an exhibition is this? The public lands are exposed to public auction, the prices reduced in order to encourage sales, and the President stands by, exulting at the amount, when suddenly he declares that he will permit no speculations, and that he will raise the price of the lands by raising the price of what alone he will receive for them. Now supposing it is true that men have bought too much land, what right has the President to dictate to the citizens of this country, whether they buy too much land or too much breadcloth? They might be permitted to know and to manage their own concerns quite as well as he does, leaving the evil, if it be one, to correct itself, by its own excess. If he prohibits the receipt of any thing but the same prohibition as to the duties on hardware, headcloths or wines, whenever his paternal wisdom shall see us buying too many shovels or too many boots,

or too much champagne—and thus bring the entire industry of the country under his control. These troubles are not however, to be wholly useless, if we extract from them two great lessons. The first is, that we can have no permanent financial prosperity while the public revenue is separated from the business of the country and committed to rash and ignorant politicians with no guides but their own passions and interests. I have little doubt that the specie order is the revenge of the President upon Congress for passing the Distribution Law. I have less doubt that this disposition of the revenue among a multitude of Banks was to advance the obscure aspirations of some Treasury Cossack.

The other lesson is—one a thousand times repeated and a thousand times forgotten—to distrust all demagogues of all parties, who profess exclusive love for what they call the People. For the last six years the country has been nearly convulsed by efforts to break the mutual dependence of all classes of citizens, and to array the laborer against his employer as his enemy, and to array the poor against the rich. These trasy declaimers have ended by bringing the country into a condition where its whole industry is subject far more than it ever was before, to the control of the large capitalists—and where very steep steps inevitably to make the rich richer and the poor poorer.

It remains to speak of the remedy of these evils. They follow obviously the causes of them. The causes are the injudicious transfers of the public monies, and the Treasury order about specie. The first measures of relief therefore should be, the instant repeal of the Treasury order requiring specie for lands—the second, the adoption of a proper system to execute the distribution law.

These measures would restore confidence in twenty-four hours, and repose at least in many days. If the Treasury will not adopt them voluntarily, Congress should immediately command it. In the mean time, all forbearance and calmness should be maintained. There is great reason for anxiety—none that ever for alarm—and with mutual confidence and courage, the country may yet be defended itself against the Government. In that struggle, my own poor effort shall not be wanting. I go for the Country, whoever rules it—let it go for the Country, best loved when most governed—it will afford me far more gratification to assist in repairing its wrongs, than to triumph over those who inflict them.

With great respect and regard, yours,  
N. BIDDLE.  
For JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, Washington, D. C.

**WILLIAM W. GRAY'S**  
**INVALUABLE**  
**ointment,**  
For Ulcers, Tumours, &c.  
Can now be obtained of the patentee, at the office of the Raleigh Register.  
Single Pot, 1 dollar—One dozen, 9 dollars.  
**WILLIAM W. GRAY.**  
Raleigh, October 8, 1836.

For five or six years previous to the Spring of 1834, a Negro man of mine had been much afflicted with an ulcerated arm and hand, which rendered him almost useless. The ulcer embraced that part of his arm from the elbow down, including his entire hand, which was literally a mass of putrefaction. A joint of one finger, and a part of the thumb, perished and dropped off. A more distressing and hopeless case I have never beheld. It was abandoned by his physicians as incurable, except by amputation of the hand.

The best medical treatment having failed to relieve the man, I placed him under the care of Mr. William W. Gray, in this place, who, with his Ointment, has effectually cured the case, although the Negro was frequently absent for weeks and months together. He has been entirely well for the last eight months, and I have good reason to believe will continue so.

**WILLIAM BOYLAN.**  
**ANOTHER GREAT CURE!**  
Raleigh, September 21, 1836.  
I am now 58 years of age—when in my 17th year, I received a wound on my left leg, which became ulcerated, and continued so until the first of March last. It would occasionally heal up, and then break out again; but most of the time, it was in a very painful condition, the sore having extended to a large size, and become very deep. I tried many remedies to make a cure, without success, until I applied Gray's Invaluable Ointment, two pots of which were effectually cured my leg, and reduced it to its natural size. The cure would have been made much sooner, had I strictly attended to the directions for the use of the Ointment; but this I failed to do, while I took much exercise, and very imprudently used tight bandages. My leg has been well for more than six months, during which time, I have walked much, yet it remains firm and free from all soreness or inflammation. After having been afflicted for a period of forty-one years, I now enjoy the benefit of a sound leg again.

**LEWIS HOLMAN.**  
**BENJAMIN FRALEY,**  
**TAILOR,**  
HAS just received the latest fashions from New York and Philadelphia, imported from London and Paris. He continues to carry on the above business at THE LARGE BRICK ROW, Salisbury, where he is prepared to do all kinds of Tailoring in a very superior style, durable and fashionable, and warranted to fit well. All orders from a distance will be most faithfully executed, agreeable to order or promise. All kinds of cutting will be done by him on short notice. He still continues to act as Agent for some of the most fashionable Tailors of New York and Philadelphia, to forewarn any Tailors wishing instruction in the art of Cutting can be instructed by calling on Benjamin Fraley, Salisbury, at the large Brick Row.

**Notice.**  
A GREABLE to a contract made and entered into between Eli Sherrill, Sr., and myself, I am held and bound in a bond to pay all the just debts, that the said Eli Sherrill owed previous to the 20th day of April last. According to contract, I have settled a considerable amount of his debts, and I am now prepared and willing to pay the balance that is due. All these having claims or debts contracted with the said Eli Sherrill previous to the 20th of April last, are hereby notified and required to present them to me for payment.  
**JAMES HARWELL.**  
Lincoln Co., N. C., Dec. 17, 1836.



**New, Rich, and Fashionable**  
**JEWELLERY,**  
**JUST RECEIVED!**  
THE Subscriber has just returned from Philadelphia with a very Rich Assortment of  
**Watches, Jewellery, &c,**

consisting of  
Gentlemen's & Ladies' fine Gold Lever Watches  
Do. Silver do. do.  
English, French, and Swiss  
Fine Gold Fob Chains, and Keys.  
Ladies' Gold Neck Chains.  
Shell Music Boxes.  
A very rich assortment of Breast-pins, Ear-rings and Finger-rings.  
Silver, Plated, and Jet Belt Buckles.  
A large assortment of silver Spectacles, with case, dividing, green, and double glasses.  
Silver Combs and Butter-knives.  
Silver Fruit Knives and Thumb-nails.  
Do. Pencils and Tooth Picks.  
A very superior assortment of Razors made by Rogers, Shephard, and Wade & Butcher's Dirk, Pocket, and Pen Knives.

Fine Plated and Paper Castors and Candle-sticks.  
German Silver, Table, Desert, and Tea-spoons, warranted superior to silver, and cheaper.  
Silver Spoons.  
Together with Purses, Steel Chains, Keys, and Fine Pistols, and Percussion-caps.  
He invites the Public to call and see his assortment. Those living at a distance will have their orders filled on as good terms as if they were present.  
**JOHN C. PALMER.**  
Salisbury, N. C., Dec. 3, 1836.

**Administrator's Notice.**  
THE subscribers having qualified at November Term of Rowan County Court, as Administrators on the Estate of the late Fielding Slater, hereby give notice to all persons having claims against said Estate, to present them legally authenticated within the time prescribed by law, or the notice will be paid in full of their recovery; and all persons indebted to said Estate, are requested to come forward and settle the same.  
**THOMAS CRAIG,** Adm.  
**BURTON CRAIG,** Adm.  
December 3, 1836.

**Negroes to Hire.**  
WILL be Hired, for Twelve Months, at the Courthouse in Salisbury, on the 2nd day of January next, Three likely young Negroes belonging to the estate of Fielding Slater, &c. The Negroes are to be taken out of the County.  
**THOMAS CRAIG,** Adm.  
**BURTON CRAIG,** Adm.  
December 17, 1836.

**Administrators' Notice.**  
THE subscribers having qualified, at the November Term, Rowan County Court, as Administrators on the Estate of James Craig, dec'd, hereby request all persons having claims against said Estate to present them legally authenticated within the time prescribed by law, or the notice will be paid in full of their recovery; and all persons indebted to said estate are requested to make payment without delay as no indulgence will be given.  
**ROBERT N. CRAIG,** Adm.  
**THOS. CRAIG,** Adm.  
Rowan Co., November 27, 1836.

**Classical School.**  
THE subscriber respectfully informs his friends and the public generally, that the exercises of his School will be resumed on Monday, the 2nd day of January, 1837, at the Rocky River State Academy, eight miles south of Concord.  
Instruction will be given in the following branches: Latin, Greek, and English Languages; Geography, Arithmetic, Algebra, and Geometry; also History and Natural Philosophy, if desired.  
Tuition per session, \$10—Board (wood and washing included) \$6 per month.  
It is particularly desired that each student should be prompt in his attendance at the commencement of the session.  
As the subscriber has already afforded to the public an opportunity of becoming acquainted with his qualifications and manner of teaching, addressing himself now to the friends of education he respectfully solicits their patronage.  
**RALPH H. GRAVES.**  
December 17, 1836.

**A Valuable Tract of Land**  
**For Sale!**  
I NOW offer for sale my Tract of Land lying on the North Yalkin, on the main road leading from Salem to Statesville, containing about  
**426 ACRES.**  
There is a good TAN-YARD, and also a Dwelling House, with all the necessary buildings for a farm—and all in good repair. This is a fine stand for a  
**Store-House, and House of Entertainment.**  
The situation is healthy—Water good. Any person who may wish to purchase this plantation would do well to examine the same, and in so doing documents sufficient will be offered to prompt any one to purchase. Col. Caswell Harlan, of Mocksville, will act as my agent in the sale of the above property, who is authorized to give title upon the purchaser complying with the terms.  
**JAMES M. OWENS.**  
September 17, 1836.